Sacramento Sexual Harassment Lawyer Blog

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Hill's 7th Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Is Unsupported By the Evidence

Hill's 7th Cause of action largely duplicates her other causes of action and alleges that Defendants' conduct caused her severe emotional distress. Defendants deny this claim, which fails for the same reasons as the underlying claims on which it is based. Further, the purported conduct Hill seeks to rely upon to support her claim is neither "extreme" nor "outrageous" as a matter of law, or is nonsensical (e.g., gay men who did not sleep with Lee were fired). For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Hill's 10th Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code Section 226 Is Unsupported by the Evidence

Hill's 10th cause of action alleges that she requested to review her wage statements, but was denied the opportunity entitling her to a $750 penalty under Labor Code Section 226(f). Defendants deny this claim. Hill never requested to review her wage statements, and a letter from her lawyer to a lawyer for RLAC asking for a copy of her personnel file did not constitute a request for payroll records (which were not kept in any personnel file) by Hill within the meaning of Section 226. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Sexual Harassment Case Includes Emotional Distress Claim, Part 5 of 10" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Hill's 2nd Cause of Action for Discrimination Based on Sex Is Unsupported By the Evidence

The thrust of Hill's gender discrimination claim is that Lee favored his male purported paramour Davis White over her, afforded him preferential treatment and terminated her to give White her accounts. Defendants deny Hill's claim in all respects. White and Lee were not involved in a romantic relationship at any time during White's employment. Furthermore, Hill has admitted, and numerous witnesses will testify, that none of her work was taken away and given to White. And, even if Lee was in a relationship with, and favored, White over Hill (and her other male co-workers), this does not constitute gender discrimination as a matter of law. Proskel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626, 1630 (1996) For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Where, as here, there is no conduct other than favoritism toward a paramour, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that no claim of sexual harassment or discrimination exists ). Finally, the evidence demonstrates that Hill was terminated because she was unable to satisfactorily perform her job as agent, including not closing a single deal for a RLAC client.

Hill's 3rd, 5th and 6th Causes of Action for Retaliation Are Unsupported By the Evidence

Continue reading "Sacramento Arstists Agent Terminated By Employer After Sex Suit, Part 4 of 10" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Hill's 1st Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment and 4th Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Harassment Are Unsupported by The Evidence

Hill's harassment claims are based on her assertion that her former friend and supervisor Randy Lee used vulgar language in her presence that she purports to have found offensive and harassing. Defendants deny that Hill was subject to unlawful harassment. Hill has admitted, and numerous witnesses will testify, that Hill and Lee were friends who vacationed and regularly socialized together, that Hill used vulgar language around Lee (and even sent him a video of naked men with exposed penises) and that Hill never complained to Lee about his use of vulgar language. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The evidence demonstrates that Lee's speech and conduct was not because of Hill's gender (if she had been a man, she would have been subjected to the same speech), unwelcome to Hill or so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of Hill's employment and created a hostile work environment. In addition, much of the speech upon which Hill hopes to base her claim - for example, Lee's private discussions with his female friends -- is protected by the free speech guarantees under the First Amendment and California constitution. All such evidence must be excluded. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932-34 (1982) (verdict must be vacated where court cannot tell if the verdict was based, in part, on constitutionally-protected activity). (See Part 4 of 10.)

Continue reading "Vulgar And Offensive Language Leads To Sexual Harassment Suit In Sacramento, Part 3 of 10" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES PRESENTED AND ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

The Court granted summary adjudication on Hill's 8th and 9th causes of action for overtime pay and meal penalties, and Hill has agreed to entry of judgment on her related 11th cause of action under Labor Code Section 201. Accordingly, Hill has eleven remaining causes of action. As set forth below, one of Hill's causes of action will be tried to the Court and, depending on the outcome of that proceeding, eleven of the causes of action may be tried to the jury. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

14th Cause of Action under Business & Professions Code § 17200 to Be Decided By Court

Hill's 14th Cause of Action for violation of Business Professionals Code Section 17200 (harassment, discrimination, and retaliation on the basis of sex) must be tried to the Court rather than the jury. Hodge v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 4th 278, 281 (2006) ( We conclude no jury trial is warranted. The gist of the section 17200 cause of action is equitable and the relief sought is equitable even though plaintiffs could have requested damages for the same violations, even though the employer has asserted an affirmative defense, and even though the UCL cause of action will require proof of the underlying Labor Code violations. ); People v. First Fed. Credit Corp., 104 Cal. App. 4th 721,732-733 (2002) ( [T]he concern that juror passion or prejudice may affect a punitive damage award ... is absent in UCL cases because there is no right to a jury trial in such cases.")

Continue reading "Sacramento Artists Collective Subjects Employees To Sexual Harassment, Part 2 of 10" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gabrielle Hill's ("Hill") Complaint never should have been filed. Though she has sued her gay, former friend and boss defendant Randy Lee ("Lee") and his company, Randy Lee Artists Collective ("RLAC"), for sexual harassment based almost entirely on Lee's use of vulgar speech, the evidence shows that his speech was not directed at or about her, that Lee was Hill's close personal friend, that she had expressed love for Lee and referred to him as "sweetie," "doll," and "sunshine," that she regularly socialized and vacationed with him, and that she herself used vulgar language (including the words "cunt," "cock," and "bitch"), and Hill talked about sex (and her boyfriend’s penis size) around Lee (and even sent Lee a video of completely naked men dancing with their pensises exposed). For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Based on these facts and many others like them - most of which are undisputed - Hill will be unable to establish each of the necessary elements of a claim for unlawful harassment: (1) that she was subjected to unwelcome and offensive speech or conduct, (2) because she is a woman, and (3) that such speech or conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of Hill's employment and created a hostile work environment. Furthermore, to the extent that Hill seeks to base her claim on speech that was not even directed at her -- for example, Lee's conversation with his female friends -- her claim must be dismissed based on the right of free speech guaranteed Lee by First Amendment of the United States Constitution and its California counterpart, article I, section 2 of the California Constitution (hereafter collectively the "First Amendment").

Hill's other claims fair no better. Hill cannot prove gender discrimination without evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her gender. If anything, the evidence shows that Hill was treated better than her male co-workers.

Continue reading "Female Artists Agent Sues Sacramento Employer for Sexual Harassment, Part 1 of 10" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

ARGUMENT

The plaintiff has stated sufficient facts of discrimination in employment, (First Cause of Action), intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, (Second Cause of Action), and actual controversy, (Third Cause of Action), Code Civ. Proc. sec. 430.10 (e). Each cause of action in the pleading is written clearly, unambiguously, and with certainty as to all facts and elements for the causes of action. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 430.10 (f).

If there be any other reason that the pleading must be repaired, an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is reviewable for abuse of discretion "even though no request to amend the pleading was made." Code Civ. Proc. sec. 472c(a); see Kolani v. Gluska (1998) 64 CA4th 402, 412, 75 CR2d 257, 263.

The plaintiff has thoroughly reviewed the pleading before filing it and it does not contain a request to amend the pleading. However, it may be considered an abuse of discretion if a potentially effective amendment is "both apparent and consistent with plaintiff's theory of the case." Camsi IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 CA3d 1525, 1542, 282 CR 80, 89. The outcome of this case is important not only to the plaintiff's future and her plans to marry an employee, but for a large public interest who have received services for over twenty years from the defendants.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully requests the demurrer be denied and the counts answered.

Continue reading "Public Mental Health Agency Sued For Sexual Harassment & Discrimination By Sacramento Woman, Part 5 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

The actual causation is their denial to allow their employees to marry any person by their employment contract. Their reasons for the outrageous conduct cite an abuse of power and the need for that abuse of power due to the plaintiff and employee being clients and once homeless. The defendants are completely knowledgeable of the plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional distress and their outrageous conduct is of an intentional nature of unreasonable acts to all humans under the laws of the State of California and unlawful contracts. The plaintiff further seeks exemplary damages.

The plaintiff is seeking damages for the injury of the third cause of action for declaratory relief. The equitable relief is necessary and proper due to there being an unlawful contract denying her the right to marry one person, monetary damages alone would not remedy this controversy. Declaratory relief is necessary and proper for reason of public interest in that the unlawful employment contract and discriminatory hiring policies apply to all employees, applicants for employment, and clients, equally, and not only to the plaintiff. Declaratory relief is necessary and proper because the plaintiff has exhausted every administrative remedy, TAC, dated 02/05/2007.

The plaintiff clearly states that she is protected by reason of age by the Cal. F.E.H.A., Gov. Code sec. 12900 et seq., (in addition to the other reasons she has been denied a job for which she was qualified and that job was given to another person), TAC, dated 02/05/2007. (See Part 5 of 5.)

Continue reading "Employment And Sexual Discrimination Suit Filed By Sacramento Woman, Part 4 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

NATURE OF THE CASE

The plaintiff is seeking damages for the injury of the first cause of action for discrimination in hiring. The plaintiff therein sites sufficient facts and unambiguously includes each of the elements for the cause of action. The plaintiff is a protected applicant for employment and the defendant is a covered employer under the Cal. F.E.H.A., Gov. Code sec. 12900 et seq. The plaintiff states the facts of the adverse treatment of a supervisor of the defendants and the support of those acts by the Executive Director and a V.P. of the Board of Directors.

The plaintiff enquired as to, and discloses the discriminatory intent of the hiring policies. The plaintiff exhausted every administrative remedy not only by the powers of the Cal. D.F.E.H., but also in appealing to the public entities that fund as an independent contractor the defendants, the County of Sacramento, and the City of Sacramento.

The plaintiff has made a prima facie case in that she has clearly stated that she is a member of a protected class, qualified for the jobs offered and denied to her, suffered adverse action, and learned from the defendants on what basis others got the job she was seeking.

Continue reading "Discriminatory Hiring By Sacramento Public Agency, Part 3 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

With respect to both the plaintiff and the defendant the Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Act was at all times mentioned within the complaint in effect, the plaintiff has standing to sue, and has been issued a Notice of Right To Sue by the Cal. Department of Fair Employment and Housing, served to Thomas Brown, Executive Director, S.H.P., by Owen White, District Administrator, 02/28/2006, and attached to the Third Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff states the dates and actions of the defendants that deny her the right to seek employment on the basis of age, association with employees, clients, and other applicants for employment, TAC, dated 02/05/2007.

Plaintiff states the dates and actions of the defendants that deny her the right to marry one, and all employees, of the defendants, TAC, dated 02/05/2007.

Plaintiff states the dates and actions of the defendants to intentionally inflict severe emotional distress, their actions and words to involve her case manager at Sacramento Mental Health, their transferring her to a different shelter, TAC, dated 02/05/2007.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment Claim Filed By Sacramento Woman, Part 2 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER

SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS' POSITION

Defendant S.H.P., moves the court to sustain a demurrer to each of the causes of action on the grounds that each fails to plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action, Code Civ. Proc. sec. 430.10 (e), and for reason that they believe that the complaint is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible, Code Civ. Proc. sec. 430.10 (f).

The Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer of Sacramento Housing Project to Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint for sexual harassment, dated 03/16/2007, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Sacramento Housing Project's Demurrer to Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, dated 03/16/2007 are both unverified as to any facts therein (plaintiff accepts the case citations), therefore the plaintiff will address the grounds of the demurrer, only.

Plaintiff notes that the pleading of the Third Amended Complaint, dated February 5, 2007, was written with the aid of the source Cal. Causes of Action, James Publishing, Inc., Santa Ana, CA, 2007, on the elements and Calif. Civil Practice Guide, Weil and Brown, The Rutter Group, 2008, on declaratory relief.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code sec. 12900 et seq., applies to applicants of employment equally, as to employees.

Continue reading "Sacramento Public Agency Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 1 of 5" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANT SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR FAILING IN BAD FAITH TO SUBMIT TO AN AUTHORIZED FORM OF DISCOVERY

Nothing excuses the fact that defendant has refused to commit to a date for his deposition.

This assertion highlights the fact that he has acted in bad faith and will continue to do so unless and until the Court orders him to appear for his deposition in this sexual harassment case. As stated above, there is no substantial justification for Defendant not to appear for his deposition before August 2006 and, therefore, sanctions are warranted. (C.C.P. §§2023 and 2025(j)(3)). Moreover, Ms. Brown has been forced to simply take Defendant's word that he will be available in August. There is no guarantee that Defendant will suddenly become unavailable or on another extended business trip in August, especially in light of the fact that Defendant will not commit to a date in August for his deposition at this time.

California courts have long recognized the potential for discovery abuse and noted, We are also aware the discovery process is subject to frequent abuse and, like a cancerous growth, can destroy a meritorious case or defense ... (Mannino v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 776, 778.) In adopting this theory, the court in Calcor Space Facility Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, added, Our observation of the day to day practice of law leads us to conclude this cancer is spreading and judges must become more aggressive in curbing these abuses. (53 Cal.App.4th at 219-220.)

Continue reading "Sacramento Company Must Answer For The Sexual Harassment Of Its Owner, Part 6 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANT'S DEPOSITION MUST BE COMPELLED BECAUSE WITHOUT A COURT INTERVENTION DEFENDANT WILL CONTINUE TO DELAY HIS APPEARING FOR DEPOSITION.

Defendant is clearly attempting to postpone the inevitable. Upon the filing of the instant action and the service of a deposition notice, Defendant suddenly became unavailable. When Ms. Brown's counsel offered to fly to New York so that Defendant's alleged extended business trip would not be disrupted, Defendant refused. Ms. Brown has begged and pleaded for dates upon which Defendant would be back in Los Angeles and available for his deposition. Ms. Brown has received none.

Rather, Defendant has maintained that he will be available in August. When in August? Ms. Brown has no idea because Defendant refuses to commit to a date at this time. Presumably, Defendant expects Ms. Brown to wait until August and then, upon his return to Los Angeles, attorneys for both sides can schedule a deposition. According to Defendant, such behavior is permissible because no trial date has been set in this sexual harassment matter.

Continue reading "Workplace Harassment Suit Filed By Female Sacramento Employee, Part 5 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

LEGAL ARGUMENT

THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO APPEAR FOR HIS DEPOSITION

California Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter C.C.P. ) § 2025(j)(3) provides, in relevant part
If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party ... without having filed a valid objection under subdivision (g), fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. Id.

Moreover, the Code defines the "misuse" of the discovery process as a failure to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (C.C.P. § 2023(a)(4)). In the instant action, Ms. Brown properly noticed Defendant's deposition and Defendant has flatly refused to comply with the deposition notice. To make matters worse, Defendant has refused to provide dates on which he could appear at his deposition in this egregious sexual harassment case. Accordingly, this Court has the power to compel Defendant to attend his deposition forthwith. (See Part 5 of 6.)

Continue reading "Defendant Refuses To Appear In Sacramento Sexual Harassment Case, Part 4 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Three more times on June 8, 2006, Ms. Brown's counsel requested firm deposition dates for Defendant's deposition. On or about June 9 and June 10, Ms. Brown's counsel again requested concrete deposition dates. In response to Ms. Brown's counsel's emails, Mr. Steinman responded on or about June 10, 2006 and stated that there was no need to depose Defendant before August since there was no trial date set in this sexual harassment matter.

Ms. Brown's counsel responded to Mr. Steinman's email by again offering to fly to New York to take Defendant's deposition and reiterating that the fact that there has not yet been a status conference or trial date set is of no moment and is not a valid excuse to delay the taking of Defendant's deposition.

In all, Defendant has contended that he must not appear for his deposition before August 2006 because: 1) he is on a business trip in New York; 2) this case has not been set for trial; and 3) Ms. Brown will not be prejudiced if forced to wait. None of these excuses are legitimate reasons as to why Defendant's deposition should be postponed for months. Moreover, to this day, defendant has failed to give Ms. Brown concrete dates upon which he would be available for his deposition.

Continue reading "Owner Of Sacramento Design Company Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 3 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On or about June 1, 2006, Ms. Brown properly noticed Defendant's deposition to take place on or about June 24, 2006. Defendant refuses to appear for his deposition. In order to avoid the need for Court intervention, Ms. Brown has made numerous attempts to meet and confer with Defendant to no avail. Ms. Brown's counsel and Defendant's counsel made numerous exchanges via email in attempt to meet and confer.

On or about June 6, 2006, Joel Steinman (hereinafter "Mr. Steinman"), counsel for Defendant, notified Ms. Brown's counsel that his client was unavailable for his deposition on June 24, 2006. On or about June 7, 2006, Mr. Steinman again reiterated that Defendant would be unavailable until August 2006. Mr. Steinman also stated that Ms. Brown would not be prejudiced by this delay since a trial date was not yet set.

Later that day, Ms. Brown's counsel sent Mr. Steinman an email in again asking for concrete dates for Defendant's deposition. Ms. Brown's counsel also reminded Mr. Steinman that Ms. Brown need not show that she would be prejudiced by the delay under the Code.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment Suit Filed By Sacramento Woman, Part 2 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

This motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2025(o) and 2023 on the grounds that Defendant Doug Jeremy refuses to appear for his properly noticed deposition and continues to contend that he is unavailable for his deposition until August 2006 at the earliest. At this time, Defendant refuses to commit to a date for his deposition.

Plaintiff brings this Motion because Defendant Jeremy's reasons for failing to make himself available for deposition are unreasonable and constitute a blatant attempt on Defendant's part to impede Plaintiff's right to conduct discovery in this matter. Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to meet and confer in order to avoid the need for court intervention to no avail.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION.

Defendant Doug Jeremy (hereinafter Defendant ) is accustomed to getting what he wants on his own terms. As the outspoken owner of Defendant Universal Design, Inc., Defendant sets his own rules. In fact, if one were to look at his behavior, he or she would conclude that Defendant answers to no one. Whether he is "playing with himself' in front of a Jane magazine reporter, prancing around in his "dick and ball cover" in front of his employees, or walking around the office in his underwear, one thing remains clear: no one tells Defendant what he can or cannot do.

Continue reading "Sacramento Woman Files Sexual Harassment Suit Against Employer, Part 1 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Ms. Black's Prior Sexual Behavior With Individuals Others Than Plaintiff Has No Probative Value And Is Unduly Prejudicial.

Evidence Code section 352 provides:

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the trial. Evidence Code Sec. 352.

In the instant matter, the clear intent and likely result of inquiring into and introducing evidence of Ms. Black's prior sexual conduct is to prejudice the jury against Ms. Black and XYZ. Such evidence, however, has no probative value and no place in this trial. Indeed, as stated most eloquently by the California Legislature:

The Legislature concludes that the use of evidence of a complainant's sexual behavior is more often harassing and intimidating than genuinely probative, and the potential for prejudice outweighs whatever probative value that evidence may have. Absent extraordinary circumstances, inquiry into those areas should not be permitted, either during discovery or at trial. Id. at 14 (citing Stats. 1985, ch. 1328, § 1, pp. 4654-4655.)

No such extraordinary showing has or can be made here. On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of such testimony is quite apparent in light of the issues of this case.

Continue reading "Sacramento Employer Tries To Exclude Accuser's Sexual History From Wrongful Termination Suit, Part 5 of 5" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

The holdings of these California and federal courts, in addition to the California Legislature's stated intent, clearly apply to the underlying complaint of sexual harassment by Ms Black in this case. Allowing evidence of Ms. Black's prior sexual conduct, including prior complaints of sexual harassment, with anyone other than the alleged harasser would undermine the clear intent of the California Legislature to prevent the discouragement of complaints and the unnecessary badgering of harassment victims. See Rieger v. Arnold, 104 Cal. App. 4th, at 460. Ms. Black's conduct with individuals other than the Plaintiff, whether in or out of the workplace, is not relevant to the central issue of whether Plaintiff engaged in conduct that violated XYZ's sexual harassment policy justifying his termination.

A case based upon the conduct of a [claimant's] coworkers should not be turned into an investigation of [claimant's] prior sexual history. Knoettigen v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 11, 15 (1990). In short, Ms. Black's private life and/or sexual history with individuals other than Plaintiff does not provide lawful consent to the offensive sexual conduct engaged in and acknowledged by Plaintiff in this case, and which resulted in his termination.

Moreover, inquiry into sexual aspects of Ms. Black's private life not only intrudes upon Ms. Black's right to privacy, but the privacy of third parties as well. See Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 557, 568 (1988). Insofar as [Plaintiff] seek[s] to pry into [Ms. Black's] sexual conduct with others, [he] necessarily seek[s] to pry into the third party's sexual conduct. (citation). Id. When privacy is implicated, the appellate courts have been vigilant to provide extraordinary relief to prevent impairment of these protections. Knoettigen v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d. at 14-15. (citations omitted) While theoretically such third parties could seek to appear in this action and oppose [Plaintiff's efforts] (citation), such privilege under these circumstances is meaningless.... See Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 568.

Continue reading "Sacramento Man Sues Employer For Wrongful Termination, Part 4 of 5" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

In Rieger, the court found that testimony about a sexual harassment plaintiff's racy banter, sexual horseplay, and statements concerning prior proposed or planned sexual exploits were subject to exclusion under California Evidence Code section 1106 unless such conduct involved the alleged perpetrator. See id. at 460-467. The Rieger court also noted:

The legislature declared its intent in enacting section 1106 as follows: [I]t is the existing policy of the State of California to ensure that causes of action for...sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery are given proper meaning. The discovery of sexual aspects of complainant's [sic] lives, as well as those of their past and current friends and acquaintances, has the clear potential to discourage complaints and to annoy and harass litigants [which] is unnecessary and deplorable. Without protection ..., individuals whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offensively intruded upon might face the ... risk of enduring further intrusions into details of their personal lives in discovery, and in open quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings. [ ] ... [A] similar state of affairs once confronted victims in criminal prosecutions for rape ....

The Legislature has taken measures to curb those abuses in rape proceedings. It is the intent of the Legislature to take similar measures in sexual harassment ... cases. [ ] The Legislature concludes that the use of such evidence of a complainant's sexual behavior is more often harassing and intimidating than genuinely probative.... (citation omitted). Id. at 460.

Continue reading "Hostile Work Environment Results In Wrongful Termination Of Sacramento Man, Part 3 of 5" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in a personal injury case present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standards Governing Motions In Limine.
A party may bring a motion in limine to exclude evidence on the same grounds as any evidentiary objection that may be made at trial. A court may make an in limine order that counsel and witnesses may not mention objectionable matters before the jury, to avoid creating an improper inference in the jurors' minds that a subsequent instruction to disregard those matters may not cure. A trial court has inherent power to entertain and grant a motion in limine. 3 Witkin, California Evidence (4th ed.), § 368.369.

B. Inquiry Into And Admission Of Evidence Of Ms. Black's Prior Sexual Conduct With Individuals Other Than The Harasser Is Irrelevant and Inadmissible.

Under California Evidence Code section 350, no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. Cal. Evid. Code § 350. Relevant evidence is defined as any evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. Cal. Evid. Code § 210. Defendants anticipate that Plaintiff will attempt to elicit testimony and submit evidence regarding Ms. Black's prior sexual history and/or conduct with others, including prior complaints by Ms. Black of sexual harassment against individuals other than Plaintiff, in an attempt to show that the conduct complained of by Ms. Black was not unwelcome or offensive and to improperly impugn Ms. Black's character. Such evidence is not relevant to establishing whether Defendant XYZ discriminated against Plaintiff.

Continue reading "False Sexual Harassment Charges Lead To Termination Of Sacramento Man, Part 2 of 5" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Defendants' Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence of Defendant Tamara Black's Prior Sexual History

INTRODUCTION

Defendants XYZ Security, Ken Brown, Tim Lee, Sondra Green, and Tamara Black (collectively "Defendants") respectfully move this Court, in limine, to preclude Plaintiff, Bobby White ("Plaintiff"), his counsel, and witnesses from commenting upon, inquiring into, and introducing evidence at trial relating to Ms. Black's alleged past sexual conduct with anyone other than Plaintiff, and prior complaints of sexual harassment Ms. Black made unrelated to Plaintiff. This motion is made on the grounds that evidence of past sexual conduct with individuals other than Plaintiff is not relevant to the issues in this case. Whether Plaintiff was terminated because of his race and gender does not turn on the private sexual behavior of Ms. Black. The admission of such evidence, introduced by Plaintiff in an effort to bolster his claims, also is prohibited as a matter of law.

This motion is based on the California Evidence Code sections 350, 1106, and 352 the California Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.220, the memorandum of points and authorities set forth below, the papers and records filed herein, and such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of this motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff has sued his former employer, XYZ Security and various of his co-workers, following his termination in October 2005 for violation of XYZ's harassment and discrimination policy.

Continue reading "Sacramento Man Fights Wrongful Termination, Part 1 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Plaintiff was falsely accused of sexually harassing defendant Tamara Black. Defendants' investigations into these allegations were incredibly sloppy and shoddy, and not in compliance with their own policies. Defendants, through their expert witness disclosure, have declared that Hall would offer testimony on the following subjects:

It is anticipated that Ms. Hall will offer testimony relating to human resource matters, including but not limited to, the prevention of discrimination and harassment, and responding to complaints of discrimination and harassment, effective investigation procedures generally and particularly as the apply to the investigations done in this case. Ms. Hall will be asked to review any opinions offered by Plaintiff's expert and offer her own opinions in rebuttal.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Ms. Hall's Testimony Should Be Excluded To The Extent It Consists of Improper Legal Conclusions, Usurping The Function of The Trier of Fact To Determine The Reasonableness of Defendants' Conduct

Expert opinion testimony is inadmissible when it involves the manner in which the law should apply to a particular set of facts and includes a legal conclusion based upon the analysis. (See Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1179.) Even if the expert's opinion does not address a question of law, it is not appropriate if it invades the province of the jury to decide a case. An expert opinion is supposed to help the jury in doing its work, not usurp the function of the jury. (Id. at 1183.) Expert opinion about the significance of evidence does not assist the jury but instead creates an unacceptable risk that a jury would pay unwarranted deference to the expert's expertise who, in reality, may be in no better position than the jury to evaluate the evidence. (Kotla v. Regents of the Univ. Of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283, 293.) When opinions are nothing more than an attempt to direct the jury to the ultimate conclusion that the expert wants them to reach, such opinions are inadmissible, as the opinion amount to advocacy not testimony. (Summers, 69 Cal.App.4th at 1185.)

Continue reading "Sacramento Sexual Harassment Plaintiff Challenges Use Of Expert At Trial, Part 2 of 2" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff's Motion In Limine Exclude Testimony of Defendants' Human Resources Expert Tina Hall

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bobby White (hereinafter "Plaintiff" ) respectfully moves the Court for an order in limine to exclude any testimony from Defendants' proposed human resources expert Tina Hall (hereinafter "Hall"). Plaintiff brings this motion on the grounds that Hall's proposed testimony would improperly usurp the role of the jury by offering her own unnecessary and improper legal conclusions as to how this case should be decided. Hall will offer opinions, under the mantle of expert, that XYZ Security applied effective investigation procedures to the investigations done in this case. Hall's proposed testimony should be excluded under Evidence Code section 801 because it is not related to a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. Further, allowing Hall to offer her improper legal conclusions would unduly prejudice Plaintiff, while wasting the time and resources of the Court, the parties and the jury. Hall's testimony regarding plaintiff's alleged sexual harassment, therefore, also should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352.

This motion is based on the supporting memorandum of points and authorities, the pleadings, records and papers on file in this action, herein, and upon such further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of the hearing. (See Part 2 of 2.)

Continue reading "Sacramento Security Agency Sued For Improper Sexual Harassment Allegations, Part 1 of 2" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Black’s Opinions Will Assist the Trier of Fact and Therefore Are Relevant and Admissible.

Finally, defendants argue that Mr. Black’s opinions as to the City's violations of its internal policies and procedures are not relevant to any of the issues in this case, and that testimony about those opinions might confuse or mislead the jury. On the contrary, defendants failure to follow its own policies and procedures, with respect to the prevention of sexual harassment and their response to complaints of sexual harassment, are evidence which tend to prove the prior notice element of plaintiffs' sexual harassment cause of action. It also proves their failure to prevent sexual harassment itself (including the mandate to conduct an investigation) and retaliation. See, e.g., Kotla v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283, 294 n. 6 [opinion testimony by a qualified expert that an employer significantly deviated from its ordinary personnel procedures in the aggrieved employee's retaliation case might well assist the jury in its factfinding];

Silva v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 263 [grant of summary judgment against plaintiff employee in wrongful termination case upheld in part because plaintiff had not presented any expert witness testimony regarding whether the employer conducted an appropriate investigation of underlying sexual harassment claim].

Even if some of the jurors have some familiarity with them, the elements of an effective intervention and prevention program for workplace sexual harassment are not commonly known by a typical juror. Accordingly, courts in California and other jurisdictions are finding that expert witness testimony is appropriate to establish whether the employer acted reasonably to prevent harassment and to respond to reports of alleged harassment. See, e.g., Kotla v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 294 n. 6; Holly D. v. Calif. Inst. of Tech. (9th Cir. 2003) 339, F3d. 1158, 1177; Shrout v. Black Clawson Co. (S.D. Ohio 1988) 689 F.Supp. 774, 777-778; Kimzey v. Walmart Stores, Inc. (8th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 568, 571.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment Policies At Issue In Sacramento Firefighter Lawsuit, Part 7 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Black’s Opinions Do Not Constitute the Improper Admission of Hearsay Evidence.

Defendants next argue that Mr. Black’s opinions are based on hearsay and that his report constitutes multiple hearsay. Plaintiffs do not intend to offer Mr. Black’s Expert Report into evidence at trial, so defendants' hearsay objection with respect to it is moot. More importantly, however, as noted above, expert opinions may be based on inadmissible matters, specifically including hearsay, as long as those matters are the type on which experts reasonably rely.

Experts reasonably rely on a plaintiff's description of what happened to him and how it affected him. As also noted above, experts may not testify as to the details of that hearsay. For example, an expert may testify that his or her opinion as to the nature of a personal injury is based on the injured person's hearsay statements, but such hearsay cannot be used to prove the cause of the injury. See In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1120 [overruled on other grounds in People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 763.]

Similarly, Mr. Black may testify here that his opinions regarding the defendants' conduct before and after the 2007 Gay Pride Parade, with respect to plaintiffs' unwillingness to participate, are based on hearsay statements by the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, that hearsay itself cannot be used to prove, for example, defendants' failure to prevent sexual harassment or retaliation. (See Part 7 of 7.)

Continue reading "Gay Pride Parade March Is Basis For Sacramento Firefighters' Sexual Harassment Suit, Part 6 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Black’s Opinions Are Based on Proper Matters and Do Not Constitute Legal Conclusions.

Defendants then argue that Mr. Black’s opinions are based on improper matters, e.g., speculative and incomplete facts, and constitute legal conclusions which invade the province of the Court and the jury. Mr. Black lists the information upon which he relied to formulate his expert opinions in this case on page 4 of his Expert Report. That information includes, inter alia, the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing Sexual Harassment Case Analysis Manual, defendants' internal memoranda and administrative manuals with respect to sexual harassment policy in general and this case in particular, and transcripts of the depositions taken by plaintiffs and defendants in this matter. Defendants do not even attempt to explain how this information constitutes speculation or conjecture -- which actually would be improper -- or why this is not the kind of information experts reasonably rely upon in forming an opinion on the subject matter involved.

Further, as with their argument that Mr. Black’s opinions exceed the scope of his designation, the only "opinions" to which defendants refer are Mr. Black’s conclusions that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of sexual harassment, including the failure to prevent sexual harassment, and retaliation, and were deprived of their right to privacy. Defendants conveniently ignore all the opinions set forth in his Expert Report which led Mr. Black to reach those conclusions.

Continue reading "Sacramento Firemen Forced To March In Gay Pride Parade File Sexual Harassment Action, Part 5 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Black’s Opinions Are Within the Scope of His Expertise and Plaintiffs' Designation

Defendants first argue that Mr. Black’s opinions exceed the scope of his expertise and designation. In their expert witness designation, plaintiffs described the general substance of the testimony Mr. Black is expected to give as custom and practice of municipal employers in setting and enforcing sexual harassment policies and procedures for responding to complaints, and defendants' sexual harassment policies and procedures and compliance or failure to comply therewith. Mr. Black’s expert qualifications are set forth in his Expert Report, and include the following:

30 years' experience in interpreting federal, state, and local rules, regulations, guidelines and procedures regarding equal employment opportunity [ EEO ] enforcement;

Advising city departments and commissions on compliance programs with equal employment opportunity laws, regulations, policies, and procedures;

Serving as agency-wide EEO Division Manager of the equal opportunity contracting program in connection with the 3 billion dollar San Francisco International Airport Terminal Master Plan Project; As EEO Division chief, educating prospective bidders regarding the City of San Francisco's nondiscrimination policies, including its Zero Tolerance Policy against sexual harassment in the workplace.

Educating scores of contractors, architectural engineering firms, and professional services consultants on non-discrimination in employment, including harassment prevention practices and procedures, when bidding for city, state and federally financed contracts.

Performing hundreds of wrongful termination investigations related to race, sex, sexual orientation, gender, disability.

Continue reading "Firefighters Sue For Sexual Harassment When Forced Into Gay Pride Parade, Part 4 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Defendants Have Not Shown That Expert Witness Michael Black's Opinion Testimony Is Inadmissible.
Defendants argue that any and all testimony by plaintiffs' sexual harassment expert, Michael Black, should be excluded allegedly because some of the opinions in his report: (1) go beyond the scope of his expertise and designation; (2) exceed the bounds of permissible expert testimony by offering legal conclusions; and (3) would place inadmissible hearsay before the jury. Defendants further argue that Mr. Black’s expert opinion regarding whether defendants' conduct violated internal policies and procedures is not relevant to any issue in this personal injury case, and that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice by confusing or misleading the jury into wrongly believing that Mr. Black’s statements of law or fact are accurate or that his opinions pertain to the issues to be determined in this case.

As a threshold matter, it is important to note that defendants seek to exclude all of Mr. Black’s expert opinion testimony based on their objections to some of the opinions in his Expert Report. In considering defendants' motion in limine, plaintiffs request that the Court keep the following background in mind: First, defendants chose not to designate their own sexual harassment expert. They should not be permitted to keep out testimony by plaintiffs' expert just because they could not find an expert who could support what they did in this case. Second, defendants chose not to depose Mr. Black who was timely designated. They should not be permitted to keep out all of his expert opinions just because they failed to explore the scope and bases for those opinions by deposing Mr. Black.

Continue reading "Firefighters Seek Sacramento Expert Testimony In Sexual Harassment Case, Part 3 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

With respect to subject matter: The jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the opinion . . . if that were the test, little expert opinion testimony would ever be heard, particularly in a sexual harassment matter like this. Instead, the statute declares that even if the jury has some knowledge of the matter, expert opinion may be admitted whenever it would assist the jury. People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 367 (overruled on other grounds in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914). Expert opinion testimony is excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information. Id.

Otherwise admissible opinion testimony is not objectionable (simply) because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact (e.g., fault, causation, breach of contract, etc.). Evid. Code § 805 [parentheses added]. Thus, expert opinion about an ultimate issue (or any conclusion for that matter) is admissible if it assists the jury. Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1182-1183.

With respect to expert qualification in this type of personal injury case, there are no hard and fast rules. The determinative issue is whether the witness has sufficient knowledge, skill or experience in the field so that his or her testimony would be likely to assist the jury in its search for the truth. Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37-38. Whether a particular person has sufficient expertise to testify as an expert witness depends upon the facts of the particular case, the questions propounded to the witness, and the witness' specific qualifications. People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 80.

With respect to reliable matter, an expert's opinion may be based on evidence whether or not admissible . . . if it is the kind of information experts reasonably rely upon in forming an opinion on the subject matter involved. Evid. Code § 801(b); People v. Hallquist (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 291, 295-296. Therefore, expert witnesses are specifically permitted to state that they have reviewed, considered and relied upon inadmissible hearsay evidence as the basis for their opinion. The expert may not, however, testify as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise inadmissible. People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92 [He may not under the guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.]

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment Action Filed By Sacramento Firefighters, Part 2 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiffs Jim Green, John Brown, Stan White, and Paul Jones hereby oppose defendants' Motion in Limine No. 12 To Exclude Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding the Expert Opinion Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Michael Black.

BECAUSE EXPERT OPINION REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' SEXUAL HARASSMENT CAUSES OF ACTION WOULD ASSIST THE TRIER OF FACT, MICHAEL BLACK'S TESTIMONY IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE.

Standards of Relevance and Admissibility.
No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. Evid. Code § 350. Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evid. Code § 351.

Relevant evidence means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. Evid. Code § 210.

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Evid. Code § 352.

There are three distinct requirements for admissibility of expert opinion testimony in this personal injury matter:
The subject matter must be sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion would assist the jury;

Continue reading "Sacramento Firefighters Sue For Sexual Harassment, Part 1 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Several California cases strongly encourage the Court to exercise its discretion liberally to permit amendments of the pleadings. Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939. In fact, the judicial policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified:
[w]hile a Motion to permit an amendment to a pleading to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the court...it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may be properly present his case... If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the Motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend; and, where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of their right to assert a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion (emphasis added). Calif. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 275, 278; Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.

Moreover, under California Code of Civil Procedure § 426.50, leave to amend the pleading to assert a new cause of action must be given if the party who failed to plead the cause of action has acted in good faith. California Code of Civil Procedure § 426.50 specifically provides that it should be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.

In Hirsa v. Superior Court, the court expressly held that because trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice, they are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceedings. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486. This well-established California policy rests on the fundamental policy that cases should be decided on their merits. (Id.)

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment In Workplace Leads To Suit By Sacramento Woman, Part 7 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFFS MAY RECOVER DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS OR RESTITUTION UNDER BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200

Injunctions and restitutionary relief (disgorgement of money or property unlawfully obtained) are available under the Unfair Competition Law. See Herr v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., supra, 109 CA4th at 789, 135 CR2d at 485, fn 5 - employer engaging in age discrimination in violation of FEHA was subject to prohibitory injunction under Unfair Competition Law. Therefore, Plaintiff is allowed to recover disgorgement of profits or restitution under Business and Professions Code § 17200 since their causes of action are brought under FEHA.

D. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF REQUESTS THIS COURT GRANT LEAVE TO FILE ITS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.

If Plaintiffs Complaint is deficient in any way, several California Code of Civil Procedure provisions both permit and strongly encourage the Court to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint. Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 473, the court may in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow any party to amend any pleading or proceeding. Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 576, any judge at any time before or after commencement of a trial, in furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading.... Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 426.50:
[A]ny party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleadings...to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action.

Continue reading "Female Sacramento Employee Subjected to Workplace Harassment, Part 6 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

E. DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER MUST FAIL BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS' HAVE SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 ET SEQ.

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES AN ONGOING VIOLATION.

To sufficiently plead a cause of action under this statute, Plaintiff must plead with specificity 1) an act or practice, 2) that is unfair or unlawful. See e.g., Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. 20 Cal 4th at 187; see also Motors, Inc. v Times-Mirror Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d at 740 (ruling that rarely, if ever... should an unfair UCL claim be decided by demurrer ). The statute defines unfair competition broadly as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1.

The Court has broad discretion to determine what business acts are considered unfair under Bus. & Prof. C. § 17200. See e.g., Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co. (1980) 102 CA3d 735, 740. Single acts are actionable under Bus. & Prof. C. § 17200. Klein v. Earth Elements. Inc. (1997) 59 Cal. App.4th 965, 969, fn. 3 (stating that the plain meaning of the [1992] amendment, as enacted, is that the [Unfair Competition Act] now covers single acts of misconduct. ); see also Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., Cal. App. 4th at 653-54, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d at 102; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 C4th 553, 570. Under Bus. & Prof. C. § 17204, any board, officer, person, corporation or association or... any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition can be a Plaintiff. Under Bus. & Prof. C. § 17201, any person or organization be a Defendant.

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond; i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him. Khoury v. Maly's of Calif.. Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.APp.4th 612, 616. Demurrers for uncertainty will almost certainly be overruled where the facts alleged in the complaint are presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring party or ascertainable by invoking discovery procedures are not dispositive of one or more causes of action. Id. Furthermore, a demurrer made on the ground of uncertainty must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears.

Continue reading "Workplace Abuse Leads To Suit By Sacramento Woman, Part 5 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

PLAINTIFF'S SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED
In some exceptional circumstances a separate civil action may lie where the employee's injury results from employer conduct that is outside the normal risk of employment. The Workers' Compensation Act does not preempt such actions. Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp., Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 819-820. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not a normal incident of employment. Therefore, a claim for damages based on sexual harassment is not preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act. Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 347; Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1363.

Similarly, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, age or gender is not a normal incident of employment, and therefore workers' compensation is not the exclusive remedy for injury from such discriminatory conduct. Jones v. Los Angeles, Comm. College District (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 794, 802 (holding that a claim for emotional and psychological damages is not barred where distress was allegedly caused by employer's illegal discriminatory practices.) Discrimination in employment is not a normal incident of employment. A claim for damages under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) ( Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) is not preempted by the workers' compensation act. Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, (1993). Here Plaintiff is the victim of sex discrimination. See Accardi at p. 347.

The Legislature ...did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. Id. at 353. Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer's illegal discriminatory practices. Id. ... [S]ection 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies. Moorpark v. Sup. Ct., 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1998.

Continue reading "Employee At Sacramento Company Sues For Retaliatory Firing, Part 4 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

C. DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER FAILS TO CITE TO THE CORRECT LAW
PLAINTIFF HAS PLED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM FOR RETALIATION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT AND THE MANAGERIAL PRIVILEGE DOES NOT BAR HER CLAIM

Defendants have demurred to Plaintiffs Third Cause for Retaliation against Defendant Mr. Jones without any legal or factual basis. The law on retaliation is clear. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, an employee (supervisor) the Fair Employment and Housing Act makes it unlawful for "any employer or person to retaliate against an employee for protected activities." Government Code §12940(h). Supervisors are subject to personal liability for retaliation under FEHA. Page v. Superior Court, (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1211-1212.

Defendants' analogy to Janken v. Hughes (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55 and Reno v. Baird, (l998) 18 Cal.4th 640, indicating that the actions taken against Plaintiff were common personnel management actions, is undeniably a misstatement of law. In Janken, the court clearly distinguished between a supervisor's actions that are commonly necessary personnel management actions and allegation of conduct hat violation FEHA. Janken at 62-63. The Janken court concluded that INDIVIDUAL supervisory employees should be held personally liable for conduct which violates FEHA unless their conduct is based solely on managerial decisions that are inherently necessary to perform their supervisory functions. Discussing the discrimination between harassment and discrimination, the Janken court stated, we conclude that the legislature's differential treatment of harassment and discrimination is based on the fundamental distinction between harassment as a type of conduct not necessary to a supervisor's job performance as contrasted with business or personnel management decisions. Id. The court in Reno confirms Janken's conclusion that the imposition of indivdual liability is appropriate. Reno at 645. Therefore, Defendant Mr. Jones is individually liable.

Further, individual defendants can be liable for retaliation. Wintaro v. Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc., (9th Cir. 2001) 274 F3d 1276, 1288. Supervisors are persons and potentially liable for retaliation. Wintaro v. Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc., (9th Cir. 2001) 274 F3d 1276, 1288. See also Liberto-Blanck v. City of Arroyo Grande (CD CA1999) 33 F. Supp.2d 1241, 1244;; Walrath v. Sprinkel (2002) 99 Cal.App.1237, 1242,

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment By Owner of Sacramento Company, Part 3 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER
The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a Plaintiffs pleadings by raising questions of law, such that the Plaintiff must show that the Complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. Title Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank-California (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 800, 807. The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.

The Court also considers matters that are judicially noticeable under C.C.P. § 430.30(a). The Court must sustain a demurrer only where the Complaint itself is defective, incomplete, or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. C.C.P. §§ 430.10, 430.30, 430.50; Harboring Villas Homeowners Ass'n. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429.

B. FOR THE PURPOSE OF A DEMURRER. ALL MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT MUST BE ACCEPTED AS TRUE
The only issue that can be raised by a demurrer is whether the facts pled on the face of the Complaint state a valid cause of action, not whether the allegations are true or whether they can be proven at trial. Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591. Plaintiff's allegations in the pleadings must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. National Auto & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Payne (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 403, 408; C.C.P. § 452. This rule applies no matter how unlikely the allegations may be. Dell E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 593, 604; Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l. Union Local No. 63-A, 63-B (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 176.

Continue reading "Sacramento Company Sued For Workplace Harassment, Part 2 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff Gina Smith's Opposition to Defendants' Demurrer to Complaint. This Opposition is based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and records on file herein and upon such other documentary and oral evidence as may be presented at the hearing.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gina Smith ( Plaintiff ) was employed by Defendants as a Sales Associate at a Sacramento company. Plaintiff worked for Defendants from August 2005 to March 2007. While working for Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work environment based on sex. Defendant Mr. Jones regularly made unwelcome, inappropriate comments and or/suggestive non-verbal signals to Plaintiff. Examples of this include but are not limited to the following:

a. telling PLAINTIFF that she was hired because she was good looking;
b. telling PLAINTIFF to go outside the store and bend over in order to attract more customers;
c. threatening to spank PLAINTIFF;
d. telling PLAINTIFF that he refused to hire male employees;
e. constantly cursing at PLAINTIFF;
f. constantly staring at PLAINTIFF'S breasts;
g. telling PLAINTIFF that her boobs are nice and firm ;
h. asking PLAINTIFF to show more cleavage at work by lowering her shirts;
I. asking PLAINTIFF how her breasts looked;
j. commenting on how nice PLAINTIFF'S manicures and pedicures were;
k. hugging and kissing PLAINTIFF;
l. constantly rubbing PLAINTIFF'S shoulders.

Continue reading "Sacramento Woman Sues For Sexual Harassment, Part 1 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, by All PLAINTIFFS Against All Defendants)
48. PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 47, and incorporate the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.

49. On or around September, 1998, PLAINTIFFS were terminated from their employment as a result of defendants' retaliation in response to PLAINTIFFS having protested unlawful sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the workplace.

50. It is the public policy of the State of California, as expressed in Article I, Section 8 of its Constitution and in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, federal statutory law and in common law that individuals shall not be harassed or discriminated against in their employment on the basis of sex or religion.

51. As a direct and proximate result of PLAINTIFFS' termination by DEFENDANTS, and each of them, in violation of the public policy of the State of California, PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer pain and suffering, and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress; PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of earnings and other employment benefits and job opportunities. PLAINTIFFS are thereby entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment At Sacramento Strip Club Leads To Wrongful Termination, Part 7 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of Gov't. Code §12900 et seq. By All PLAINTIFFS Against All Defendants)

39. PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 and incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.

40. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, illegally retaliated against PLAINTIFFS for objecting to and protesting the sexual harassment and discrimination perpetrated by DEFENDANTS in violation of the California Fair Employment & Housing Act, Gov't. Code §12900 et seq.

41. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendants, and each of them, cannot articulate any legitimate, business-related reason or bona fide occupational qualification to excuse their conduct.

42. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that in addition to the practices enumerated above, Defendants, and each of them, may have engaged in other discriminatory practices against them which are not yet fully known. At such time as such discriminatory practices become known to them, PLAINTIFFS will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint in that regard.

Continue reading "Wrongful Termination Action Filed Against Sacramento Strip Club, Part 6 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Employment Discrimination on Account of Sex in Violation of Gov't. Code §12900 et seq. By All PLAINTIFFS against all DEFENDANTS)

30. PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 29 and incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.

31. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, illegally discriminated against PLAINTIFFS by discriminating against them on account of their sex during the course of their employment, terminating her employment, in violation of the California Fair Employment & Housing Act, Gov't. Code §12900 et seq.

32. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, cannot articulate any legitimate, business-related reason or bona fide occupational qualification to justify or excuse their conduct.

33. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that in addition to the practices enumerated above, Defendants, and each of them, may have engaged in other discriminatory practices against them which are not yet fully known. At such time as such discriminatory practices become known to them, PLAINTIFFS will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint in that regard.

34. At all times during the employment relationship, PLAINTIFFS performed their duties in a highly satisfactory, competent and diligent manner.

Continue reading "Waitresses At Sacramento Gentlemen's Club Claim Sexual Harassment, Part 5 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

25. At all times during the employment relationship, PLAINTIFFS performed their duties in a highly satisfactory, competent and diligent manner.

26. PLAINTIFFS have filed Charges of Discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing ( DFE ), copies of which are incorporated herein by reference. Within one year of filing this complaint, the DFEH has issued a Right to Sue Notices authorizing this lawsuit, copies of which are incorporated herein by reference. PLAINTIFFS have exhausted their administrative remedies.

27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' willful, knowing and intentional discrimination against them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer pain and suffering, and extreme and severe mental anguish and emotional distress; PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of earnings and other employment benefits and job opportunities. PLAINTIFFS are thereby entitled to general and compensatory damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

28. As a further, direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of California Government Code section 12900 et seq., PLAINTIFFS have been compelled to retain the services of counsel in an effort to enforce the terms and conditions of their employment relationship with Defendants, and have thereby incurred and will continue to incur legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to them. PLAINTIFFS therefore request that attorneys' fees be awarded pursuant to California Government Code section 12965.

Continue reading "Gentlemen's Club In Sacramento Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 4 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Sexual Harassment in Violation of Gov't. Code §12900 et seq., by All PLAINTIFFS and Against All DEFENDANTS)

21. PLAINTIFFS repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 and incorporates the same by reference as though fully set forth herein.

22. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, illegally discriminated against PLAINTIFFS by sexually harassing them during the course of their employment, in violation of the California Fair Employment & Housing Act, Gov't. Code §12900 et seq. (hereinafter FEHA ), in that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, required PLAINTIFFS to wear sexually suggestive attire as a condition of employment; and/or it could be reasonably expected that if PLAINTIFFS wore the sexually suggestive attire, they would be subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment from customers or others; and/or that the requirement that PLAINTIFFS wear the sexually suggestive uniforms would essentially require them to become walking pornography in the workplace.

23. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANTS, and each of them, cannot articulate any legitimate, business-related reason or bona fide occupational qualification to excuse their conduct.

24. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that in addition to the practices enumerated above, DEFENDANTS, and each of them, may have engaged in other discriminatory practices against them which are not yet fully known. At such time as such discriminatory practices become known to them, PLAINTIFFS will seek leave of Court to amend this complaint in that regard.

Continue reading "Female Employees File Sexual Harassment Action Against Sacramento Strip Club, Part 3 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 1 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 1 employed as a stripper.

11. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 2 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 2 employed as a stripper.

12. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 3 commenced employment with DEFENDANT STARS in or about April 1998 as a waitress. At no time was PLAINTIFF DOE 3 employed as a stripper.

13. Upon the commencement of their employment, all PLAINTIFFS were instructed to wear a black skirt and white shirt of their choosing as proper work attire for waitresses. Thereupon, each PLAINTIFF selected an appropriate black skirt and white shirt to wear to work at Stars each day.

14. Shortly after the commencement of her employment with DEFENDANT STARS, PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was promoted from waitress to bartender. Thereafter, PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was promoted again, to assistant manager.

15. In or about September, 1998, Stars manager Bennie Brown informed PLAINTIFF DOE 1 that there would be no more women behind the bar, and that effective immediately, female employees would be eligible for positions only as waitresses or strippers. Thereupon PLAINTIFF DOE 1 was immediately demoted back to the position of waitress, where she earned less income and had less opportunity for advancement than in either the bartender or assistant manager position. After that time, all food servers at Stars, Sacramento Club were female, and all bartenders and management were male.

16. In or about September, 1998, all PLAINTIFFS were informed that they would no longer be permitted to wear to work the black skirt and white shirt of their choosing as they had previously worn. Instead, they would now be required to wear a very skimpy and demeaning uniform consisting of stretch hot pants that reveal substantial portions of the wearer's naked buttocks and a tiny midriff stretch top which exposes all of the wearer's stomach. PLAINTIFFS were informed that all waitresses would be required to wear this uniform from that point forward.

Continue reading "Strip Club In Sacramento Harasses Female Workers, Part 2 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

First Amended Complaint for Damages for Sexual Harassment

THE PARTIES

1. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 1 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 1 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

2. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 2 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 2 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

3. PLAINTIFF JANE DOE 3 ( PLAINTIFF DOE 3 ) was at all relevant times herein an individual female residing in the County of Sacramento.

4. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT STARS, INC. ( DEFENDANT STARS ) was at all relevant times herein a corporation licensed to do business and conducting business in the State of California, and which owns an establishment known as Stars, Sacramento Club, which is a restaurant and gentleman's club, i.e. a strip club located in Sacramento, California.

5. In the alternative, PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT STARS, INC., dba SAM, INC. ( DEFENDANT STARS ) was at all relevant times herein a corporation licensed to do business and conducting business in the State of California, and which owns an establishment known as Stars, Sacramento Club, which is a restaurant and gentleman's club, i.e. a strip club located in Sacramento, California.

6. PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and based thereon allege that DEFENDANT DAVID SMITH is an owner, officer, director and/or manager of Stars, Sacramento Club.

Continue reading "Sacramento Strip Club Sued, Part 1 of 7" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS BASED UPON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

104. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 87 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
105. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer severe emotional distress, humiliation, loss of sleep and mental anguish all to her damage.
106. Defendants' conduct, as set forth above, was intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendants' conduct was done with knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would result and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiffs and was despicable, intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and severe emotional distress. Defendants' conduct was done with the knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would as a result increase and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and the consequences to Plaintiffs. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and/or punitive damages according to proof.
107. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary damages according to proof.

Continue reading "Hispanic Workers Humiliated By Sexually Offensive Treatment By Sacramento-area Company, Part 18 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST
DEFENDANT UCC BASED UPON RETALIATION

99. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 87 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
100. The acts and words of Defendant as alleged herein above constitute adverse employment action and/or retaliation against Plaintiffs, and Defendants violated Government Code § 12940 by retaliating against Plaintiffs because they opposed Defendants’ practices as described herein above.
101. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer general damages, including, but not limited to, severe emotional distress, as alleged herein in an amount according to proof.
102. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth above, was intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendants’ conduct was done with knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would result and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiffs and was despicable, intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and severe emotional distress. Defendants' conduct was done with the knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would as a result increase and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and the consequences to Plaintiffs. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and/or punitive damages according to proof.

Continue reading "Illegal Retaliatory Firings By Sacramento-area Company Prompts Lawsuit, Part 17 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS BASED UPON HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT

93. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 87 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
94. The acts and words of Defendants as alleged herein above constitutes harassment on account of Plaintiffs' sex, race and/or national origin in the form of a hostile working environment and violated Government Code § 12940 by maintaining a hostile work place where such harassment occurred including harassment by Defendants' officers, supervisors, managing agents, directors, and/or employees as evidenced by Defendants' conduct and policies as herein above described.
95. As a direct and legal result of Defendants' harassment of Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs suffered damages as alleged herein in an amount according to proof.
96. Defendants' conduct, as set forth above, was intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendants' conduct was done with knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would result and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiffs and was despicable, intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and severe emotional distress. Defendants' conduct was done with the knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would as a result increase and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and the consequences to Plaintiffs.
97. The conduct of Defendants as alleged herein above was despicable, willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and/or punitive damages according to proof.

Continue reading "Hostile Work Environment Leads To Lawsuit By West Sacramento Workers, Part 16 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANT UCC BASED UPON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

88. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 87 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
89. The acts and/or words of Defendant as alleged herein above constitute employment discrimination against Plaintiffs based upon Plaintiffs' sex, race and/or national origin. Defendants violated Government Code § 12940 by discriminating against Plaintiffs because of Plaintiffs' sex, race and/or national origin with respect to the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' employment.
90. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer general damages, including, but not limited to, severe emotional distress, as alleged herein in an amount according to proof.
91. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth above, was intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. Defendants’ conduct was done with knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would result and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiffs and was despicable, intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and severe emotional distress. Defendants’ conduct was done with the knowledge that Plaintiffs' emotional and physical distress would as a result increase and was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs and the consequences to Plaintiffs. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive and justify the awarding of exemplary and/or punitive damages according to proof.

Continue reading "Sacramento-area Employees' Rights Violated By Sexually Abusive Superiors, Part 15 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

82. Defendant UCC and/or its agents and employees, supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors knew or should have known of the harassing actions on the basis of verbal and/or written reports of such actions made by Plaintiff to Defendant UCC's supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors. Despite Defendant UCC's actual and/or constructive knowledge of such harassing actions, Defendant UCC failed to take immediate and/or appropriate corrective action to stop the harassment. Furthermore, before the unlawful discrimination, harassment and retaliation occurred, Defendant UCC failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent such unlawful actions from occurring.
83. Defendant UCC also subjected plaintiff to discriminatory enforcement of company rules, arbitrary enforcement of rules, arbitrary write-ups, racially hostile comments, innuendos, and offensive and insulting remarks, unfair performance evaluations, contrived terminations, demotions, punishments and retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity.
84. As a proximate result and legal cause of Defendant UCC's conduct as alleged herein above, Plaintiff has been damaged in that Plaintiff has suffered the loss of wages, salary, benefits, and promotion, in an amount to be proven at time of trial.
85. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was an excellent employees with an outstanding record of dedication, loyalty and efficient service and contribution to Plaintiff's employer's goal.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment of Hispanic Employees By West Sacramento Company, Part 14 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

74. Defendant UCC maintained and/or allowed a pattern and practice of unlawful sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation against female workers, including Plaintiff herein.
75. Defendant UCC directly and/or through its agents and employees, supervisors, managers, officers or directors, allowed Plaintiff to be subjected to unlawful sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation in that Plaintiff’s acceptance of sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation by Defendants, and/or its agents employees, supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors was an express and/or implied condition to the receipt of certain job benefits and was the cause of tangible detriment to Plaintiff.
76. Such discrimination and harassment also created a sexually hostile and/or offensive working environment for Plaintiff.
77. Plaintiff was led to believe by Defendant Paul Smith and David Smith that her employment opportunities at work would be enhanced by acceding to the sexually hostile remarks, innuendos, and offensive comments.
78. Plaintiff was obliged to work in an atmosphere which was hostile to females by virtue of unsolicited and unwelcome sexual remarks and/or innuendos, advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature. The sexual harassment was sufficiently serious and pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and create a working environment which was intimidating, insulting, and abusive to female employees.

Continue reading "Unlawful Sexual And Racial Discrimination Of Sacramento-area Hispanic Workers, Part 13 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

f) Defendant Paul Smith did not utter any similar sexually and/or racially offensive words at the non-Latina workers and did not perform any same or similar acts to the non-Latina workers.
g) During the course of Green's employment at UCC, Defendant Paul Smith persistently demanded a romantic and sexual relationship with Plaintiff Patricia Green. Green repeatedly rejected Paul Smith’s demands.
h) Thereafter, Defendant David Smith spoke with Brown and demanded that Brown provide to David Smith private details and private information concerning the personal and intimate life of Plaintiff Patricia Green.
i) Brown only informed David Smith that Plaintiff Patricia Green was dating Plaintiff White, but otherwise refused to divulge any information concerning Plaintiff Patricia Green.
j) After daily sexual harassment from Defendant Paul Smith, Plaintiff Green refused to continue to work in such an abusive environment and considered herself constructively discharged and quit her employment.
72. All times herein mentioned, Defendants Paul Smith and David Smith daily maintained a pattern and practice of unlawful workplace racial discrimination and harassment against Latino and Latina plant floor workers, including Plaintiff, consisting of racial insults and racially offensive remarks, including:
- Mother fucking Mexican
- Ignorant Mexicans
- Hurry up motherfucker
- Lazy Mexican
- Fucking Mexican
- Wet back
- Fucking wet backs
- Stupid Mexican
- Mexicans are ignorant

Continue reading "Racially Offensive Environment Leads To Lawsuit By West Sacramento Workers, Part 12 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO GREEN

67. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 28 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
68. Green is a Latina female, born XX/XX/1962, and is of El Salvadoran descent and/or national origin. Green is presently 45 years of age.
69. On or about October 2003, Green was hired by Defendant UCC. Her last position with Defendant UCC was working as a floor manager, earning $9.00 per hour.
70. On or about August 15, 2006, Green was forced to quit her employment with Defendant UCC as a direct result of constructive discharge.
71. While Green was employed at UCC, she was subjected to a daily pattern and practice of sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation as a result of serious and pervasive sexual and racial discrimination and harassment against Latina workers resulting in a sexually and racially hostile work environment, including but not limited to:
a) Defendant Paul Smith vocally announced on many occasions on the work floor to the Latina workers that as the owner he had the right to demand and expect sexual favors from the Latina female workers.
b) Defendant Pal Smith did not make the same statement to the non-Latina female workers.
c) Defendant Paul Smith maintained inside the workplace areas open and notorious sexual relationship with two other women known as Marta and Justine.
d) Defendant Paul Smith made it clear to the Latina work force that things would be better for them at work is they went along with the sexual expectations. For example, Defendant Paul Smith extended more favorable treatment to the women romantically involved with him in the workplace with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

Continue reading "Abusive Local Clothing Company Owners Sued For Harassing Hispanic Employees, Part 11 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

60. Defendant UCC also discriminated against Plaintiff because of his vocal opposition to the sexual favoritism at his workplace.
61. The effect of Defendant UCC's unlawful employment practices has been to limit, classify and to discriminate against plant floor workers in ways which jeopardize and tend to deprive them of employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex and/or race, and Plaintiff is a victim of such practices, is and will continue to be unlawfully deprived of income in the form of wages and of prospective retirement benefits, seniority, social security benefits, insurance coverage and non-monetary due solely to his sex and/or race.
62. Defendant UCC and/or its agents and employees, supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors knew or should have known of the severe and pervasive sexual favoritism on the basis of verbal and/or written reports of such actions made by Plaintiff to Defendant UCC's supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors. Despite Defendant UCC's actual and/or constructive knowledge of such favoritism, Defendant UCC failed to take immediate and/or appropriate corrective action to stop the favoritism. Furthermore, before the resulting unlawful discrimination, harassment and retaliation occurred, Defendant UCC failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent such unlawful actions from occurring.
63. Defendant UCC also subjected plaintiff to discriminatory enforcement of company rules, arbitrary enforcement of rules, arbitrary write-ups, racially hostile comments, innuendos, and offensive and insulting remarks, unfair performance evaluations, contrived terminations, demotions, punishments and retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity.

Continue reading "Company Owners Violate Sacramento Hispanic Employees' Rights, Part 10 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

55. Within one year prior to the filing of the administrative complaint, Plaintiff complained to his superiors, supervisors, managers, and officers about the above described discrimination, harassment and abusive treatment.
56. Defendant UCC maintained and/or allowed a pattern and practice of unlawful sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation against female workers.
57. Such discrimination and harassment also created a hostile and/or offensive working environment for Plaintiff.
58. Plaintiff was obliged to work in an atmosphere which was hostile to females by virtue of severe and pervasive favoritism granted to Latina females plant floor workers who would go along with Defendant Paul Smith, including unsolicited and unwelcome sexual remarks and/or innuendos, advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature. The sexual harassment was sufficiently serious and pervasive to alter the conditions of Plaintiffs employment and create a working environment which was intimidating, insulting, and abusive.
59. Defendant UCC discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of Government Code Section 12940 et seq. by constructively discharging and/or firing and otherwise discriminating against Plaintiff by engaging in, tolerating and/or failing to prevent the favoritism alleged above and by failing to take any action, or make any reasonable and/or adequate investigation of plaintiff's reports of favoritism and failed to take any steps reasonably calculated to end the discrimination, harassment and retaliation and/or correct or redress the unlawful employment practices. (See Part 10 of 18.)

Continue reading "West Sacramento Clothing Company Workers Sexually Harassed, Part 9 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO PLAINTIFF WHITE

49. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs1 through 28 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
50. White is a Latino male, born XX/XX/1968, and is of Mexican descent and/or national origin. White is presently 40 years of age.
51. On or about January 2006, White was hired by Defendant UCC. His last position with Defendant UCC was working in packaging, earning $7.50 per hour.
52. On or about June 2006, White’s employment with Defendant UCC was terminated by Defendant Paul Smith on the basis that there was no work. That was and is false and is a pretext for abusive employment practices at UCC.
53. While White was employed at UCC, he endured a daily pattern and practice of sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation resulting from serious and pervasive sexual and racial discrimination and harassment against Latina workers resulting in a sexually and racially hostile work environment, including but not limited to:
a) Defendant Paul Smith vocally announced on many occasions on the work floor to the Latina workers that as the owner he had the right to demand and expect sexual favors from the Latina female workers.
b) Defendant Paul Smith did not make the same statement to the non-Latina female workers.
c) Defendant Paul Smith maintained inside the workplace areas open and notorious sexual relationship with two other women known as Marta and Justine.
d) Defendant Paul Smith made it clear to the Latina work force that things would be better for them at work is they went along with the sexual expectations.
e) Defendant Paul Smith extended more favorable treatment to the women romantically involved with him in the workplace with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

Continue reading "Mexican Workers File Lawsuit Against Sacramento-area Clothing Company, Part 8 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

41. Defendant UCC also discriminated against Plaintiff because of her vocal opposition to the harassment at their workplace.
42. The effect of Defendant UCC's unlawful employment practices has been to limit, classify and to discriminate against female employees of defendant in ways which jeopardize and tend to deprive them of employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex and/or race, and Plaintiff is a victim of such practices, is and will continue to be unlawfully deprived of income in the form of wages and of prospective retirement benefits, seniority, social security benefits, insurance coverage and non-monetary due solely to her sex and/or race.
43. Defendant UCC and/or its agents and employees, supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors knew or should have known of the harassing actions on the basis of verbal and/or written reports of such actions made by Plaintiff to Defendant UCC's supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors. Despite Defendant UCC's actual and/or constructive knowledge of such harassing actions, Defendant UCC failed to take immediate and/or appropriate corrective action to stop the harassment. Further, before the unlawful discrimination, harassment and retaliation occurred, Defendant UCC failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent such unlawful actions from occurring.
44. Defendant UCC also subjected plaintiff to discriminatory enforcement of company rules, arbitrary enforcement of rules, arbitrary write-ups, racially hostile comments, innuendos, and offensive and insulting remarks, unfair performance evaluations, contrived terminations, demotions, punishments and retaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity.

Continue reading "Latina Workers' Rights Violated By West Sacramento Company, Part 7 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

33. All times herein mentioned, Defendants Paul Smith and David Smith daily maintained a pattern and practice of unlawful workplace racial discrimination and harassment against Latino and Latina plant floor workers, including Plaintiff, consisting of racial insults and racially offensive remarks, including:
- Mother fucking Mexican
- Ignorant Mexicans
- Hurry up motherfucker
- Lazy Mexican
- Fucking Mexican
- Wet back
- Fucking wet backs
- Stupid Mexican
- Mexicans are ignorant
34. Within one year prior to the filing of the administrative complaint, Plaintiff complained to her superiors, supervisors, managers, and officers about the above described discrimination, harassment and abusive treatment.35. Defendant UCC maintained and/or allowed a pattern and practice of unlawful sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation against female workers, including Plaintiff herein.
36. Defendant UCC directly and/or through its agents and employees, supervisors, managers, officers or directors, allowed Plaintiff to be subjected to unlawful sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation in that Plaintiffs acceptance of sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation by Defendants, and/or its agents employees, supervisors, managers, officers and/or directors was an express and/or implied condition to the receipt of certain job benefits and was the cause of tangible detriment to Plaintiff.
37. Such discrimination and harassment also created a hostile and/or offensive working environment for Plaintiff.

Continue reading "Employees Rights Violated By West Sacramento Company, Part 6 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO BROWN

29. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 28 with full force and effect as though fully set forth herein.
30. Brown is a Latina female, born XX/XX/1959, and is of Mexican descent and/or national origin. Brown is presently 49 years of age.
31. On or about 2004, Brown was hired by Defendant UCC. Her last position with Defendant UCC was working in packaging, earning $7.50 per hour. On or about July 11, 2006, Brown's employment with Defendant UCC was terminated by Defendant David Smith who stated that there was no work. That was and is false and is a pretext for abusive employment practices at UCC.
32. While Brown was employed at UCC, she was subjected to a daily pattern and practice of sexual and racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation as a result of serious and pervasive sexual and racial discrimination and harassment against Latina workers resulting in a sexually and racially hostile work environment, including but not limited to:
a) Defendant Paul Smith vocally announced on many occasions on the work floor to the Latina workers that as the owner he had the right to demand and expect sexual favors from the Latina female workers.
b) Defendant Paul Smith did not make the same statement to the non-Latina female workers.
c) Defendant Paul Smith maintained inside the workplace areas open and notorious sexual relationship with two other women known as Marta and Justine.
d) Defendant Paul Smith made it clear to the Latina work force that things would be better for them at work is they went along with the sexual expectations. For example, Defendant Paul Smith extended more favorable treatment to the women romantically involved with him in the workplace with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

Continue reading "Sacramento-area Company Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 5 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

GENERAL STATEMENT OF BACKGROUND FACTS

22. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant UCC is a family owned company, operated by and owned by Paul Smith. Defendant UCC operates as merchant wholesaler with a garment factory manufacturing clothing for men, and manufacturing women's, children's, and infant's clothing. The family also operates two factories in China.
23. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs are informed and believe that: Defendant Paul Smith is of Iranian nationality, and of Muslim culture and heritage; Defendant Paul Smith is the principle owner and operator of Defendant UCC; Defendant Paul Smith is the father of Defendant David Smith.
24. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant David Smith is the son of Defendant Paul Smith and is an agent, supervisor, manager and/or managing agent of Defendant UCC at the subject premises.
25. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs worked on the manufacturing plant floor area of UCC while the plant was then located at 123 East Blvd., Sacramento, CA. Plaintiffs last worked at the subject location during 2006. During 2006, there were about 50 to 60 average number of workers per day on the manufacturing plant floor during peak months and approximately 10 to 20 average number of workers per day on the manufacturing plant floor during the slower months.

Continue reading "Hispanic Workers File Sexual Harassment Claim, Part 4 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION/RIGHT TO SUE LETTER (WHITE)
16. On or about April 15, 2007, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter “DFEH”) notified Mendoza of Plaintiff's right to initiate legal proceedings on said charge of harassment, discrimination and retaliation on account of Plaintiffs sex, race, national origin and association.17. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant UCC from January 2006 until June 2006 at which time Plaintiffs employment was terminated by Defendant Paul Smith.
18. At all times herein mentioned, the acts and/or words constituting the discrimination, harassment and/or retaliation alleged herein occurred within one year prior to the filing of Plaintiffs administrative accusation and charges with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION/RIGHT TO SUE LETTER (GREEN)
19. On or about April 15, 2007, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter “DFEH”) notified Mendoza of Plaintiff's right to initiate legal proceedings on said charge of harassment, discrimination and retaliation on account of Plaintiffs sex, race, national origin and association.
20. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant UCC from October, 2003 until August 15, 2006 at which time Plaintiff was forced to quit and/or constructively discharged.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment By West Sacramento Employer, Part 3 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

PARTIES
7. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant UNIVERSAL CLOTHING COMPANY, LLC. (hereinafter “UCC”) and Does 1 to 100, inclusive, was a corporation, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, and/or limited liability corporation, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California and doing business in the County of Sacramento, State of California, with its current principal place of business located at 1234 Main Street, West Sacramento, California and is an employer as defined in Government Code § 12926 (c).8. At all times mentioned, Defendant PAUL SMITH (hereinafter “Paul Smith”), is and has been a resident of the County of Sacramento, and was a manager, managing agent, supervisor, employee, officer, director, owner and/or partner of Defendant UCC.
9. At all times mentioned, Defendant DAVID SMITH (hereinafter “David Smith”), is and has been a resident of the county of Sacramento, and was a manager, managing agent, supervisor, employee, officer, director, owner and/or partner of Defendant UCC.
10. At all times mentioned, Plaintiff ROSA BROWN (hereinafter “Brown”), is and has been a resident of the County of Sacramento, State of California.
11. At all times mentioned, Plaintiff MANUEL WHITE (hereinafter “White”), is and has been a resident of the County of Los Angeles, state of California.

Continue reading "Workplace Harassment Suit Filed By Sacramento-area Hispanics, Part 2 of 18" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 12940 ET SEQ.
PLAINTIFFS, ROSA BROWN, MANUEL WHITE and PATRICIA GREEN, jointly and/or severally allege as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR VIOLATION OF EMPLOYMENT CIVIL RIGHTS

1. This is an action for damages to redress the deprivation of rights secured to Plaintiffs by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter “FEHA”), Government Code § 12940, et seq.
2. Plaintiffs seek to obtain relief against their former employer, the Defendants named herein and its agents and employees for subjecting Plaintiffs to discrimination, harassment and/or retaliation on account of Plaintiffs' sex, race, national origin and association. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and exemplary damages for discrimination, harassment and/or retaliation.
3. This action is brought pursuant to the California FEHA, California Government Code § 12940 et seq. Pursuant to said Act, Plaintiffs filed timely charges of discrimination regarding the acts and practices of Defendants alleged herein.
4. The true names and capacities, whether individual, associate, corporate or otherwise of Defendants Does 1 to 100 inclusive and each of them are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time who, therefore, sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to state their true names and capacities when same have been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege, that each of the defendants designated herein as a Doe is responsible in some manner for the events and occurrences herein described and is liable to Plaintiffs for the damages as herein alleged.

Continue reading "West Sacramento Workers Sue for Sexual Discrimination, Part 1 of 18" »

Sexual harassment is unwanted and unwelcome behavior, or attention, of a sexual
nature that interferes with your life. Sexual advances, forced sexual activity, statements
about sexual orientation or sexuality, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature all constitute sexual harassment. The behavior
may be direct or implied. Sexual harassment can affect an individual's work or school
performance, and can create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.

Sexual harassment can occur in a number of ways, such as:

The victim as well as the harasser can be either male or female. The
harasser does not have to be of the opposite sex.

The harasser can be anyone: the victim's supervisor, a client, a co-worker, a
teacher or professor, a schoolmate, a stranger, even a family member.

The harasser's behavior must be unwelcome.

The victim does not have to be the person directly harassed but can be anyone
who finds the behavior offensive and is affected by it.

While adverse effects on the victim are common, this does not have to be the
case for the behavior to be unlawful.

The harasser may be completely unaware that their behavior is offensive or
constitutes sexual harassment, or they may be completely unaware that their
actions could be unlawful.

Continue reading "Sexual Harassment In The California Workplace" »