Sacramento Sexual Harassment Lawyer Blog

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

LEGAL ARGUMENT

THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO APPEAR FOR HIS DEPOSITION

California Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter C.C.P. ) § 2025(j)(3) provides, in relevant part
If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party ... without having filed a valid objection under subdivision (g), fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. Id.

Moreover, the Code defines the "misuse" of the discovery process as a failure to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (C.C.P. § 2023(a)(4)). In the instant action, Ms. Brown properly noticed Defendant's deposition and Defendant has flatly refused to comply with the deposition notice. To make matters worse, Defendant has refused to provide dates on which he could appear at his deposition in this egregious sexual harassment case. Accordingly, this Court has the power to compel Defendant to attend his deposition forthwith. (See Part 5 of 6.)

Continue reading " Defendant Refuses To Appear In Sacramento Sexual Harassment Case, Part 4 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Three more times on June 8, 2006, Ms. Brown's counsel requested firm deposition dates for Defendant's deposition. On or about June 9 and June 10, Ms. Brown's counsel again requested concrete deposition dates. In response to Ms. Brown's counsel's emails, Mr. Steinman responded on or about June 10, 2006 and stated that there was no need to depose Defendant before August since there was no trial date set in this sexual harassment matter.

Ms. Brown's counsel responded to Mr. Steinman's email by again offering to fly to New York to take Defendant's deposition and reiterating that the fact that there has not yet been a status conference or trial date set is of no moment and is not a valid excuse to delay the taking of Defendant's deposition.

In all, Defendant has contended that he must not appear for his deposition before August 2006 because: 1) he is on a business trip in New York; 2) this case has not been set for trial; and 3) Ms. Brown will not be prejudiced if forced to wait. None of these excuses are legitimate reasons as to why Defendant's deposition should be postponed for months. Moreover, to this day, defendant has failed to give Ms. Brown concrete dates upon which he would be available for his deposition.

Continue reading " Owner Of Sacramento Design Company Sued For Sexual Harassment, Part 3 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On or about June 1, 2006, Ms. Brown properly noticed Defendant's deposition to take place on or about June 24, 2006. Defendant refuses to appear for his deposition. In order to avoid the need for Court intervention, Ms. Brown has made numerous attempts to meet and confer with Defendant to no avail. Ms. Brown's counsel and Defendant's counsel made numerous exchanges via email in attempt to meet and confer.

On or about June 6, 2006, Joel Steinman (hereinafter "Mr. Steinman"), counsel for Defendant, notified Ms. Brown's counsel that his client was unavailable for his deposition on June 24, 2006. On or about June 7, 2006, Mr. Steinman again reiterated that Defendant would be unavailable until August 2006. Mr. Steinman also stated that Ms. Brown would not be prejudiced by this delay since a trial date was not yet set.

Later that day, Ms. Brown's counsel sent Mr. Steinman an email in again asking for concrete dates for Defendant's deposition. Ms. Brown's counsel also reminded Mr. Steinman that Ms. Brown need not show that she would be prejudiced by the delay under the Code.

Continue reading " Sexual Harassment Suit Filed By Sacramento Woman, Part 2 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position during the early stages of litigation. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment/personal injury case and its proceedings.)

This motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2025(o) and 2023 on the grounds that Defendant Doug Jeremy refuses to appear for his properly noticed deposition and continues to contend that he is unavailable for his deposition until August 2006 at the earliest. At this time, Defendant refuses to commit to a date for his deposition.

Plaintiff brings this Motion because Defendant Jeremy's reasons for failing to make himself available for deposition are unreasonable and constitute a blatant attempt on Defendant's part to impede Plaintiff's right to conduct discovery in this matter. Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to meet and confer in order to avoid the need for court intervention to no avail.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION.

Defendant Doug Jeremy (hereinafter Defendant ) is accustomed to getting what he wants on his own terms. As the outspoken owner of Defendant Universal Design, Inc., Defendant sets his own rules. In fact, if one were to look at his behavior, he or she would conclude that Defendant answers to no one. Whether he is "playing with himself' in front of a Jane magazine reporter, prancing around in his "dick and ball cover" in front of his employees, or walking around the office in his underwear, one thing remains clear: no one tells Defendant what he can or cannot do.

Continue reading " Sacramento Woman Files Sexual Harassment Suit Against Employer, Part 1 of 6 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

Ms. Black's Prior Sexual Behavior With Individuals Others Than Plaintiff Has No Probative Value And Is Unduly Prejudicial.

Evidence Code section 352 provides:

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the trial. Evidence Code Sec. 352.

In the instant matter, the clear intent and likely result of inquiring into and introducing evidence of Ms. Black's prior sexual conduct is to prejudice the jury against Ms. Black and XYZ. Such evidence, however, has no probative value and no place in this trial. Indeed, as stated most eloquently by the California Legislature:

The Legislature concludes that the use of evidence of a complainant's sexual behavior is more often harassing and intimidating than genuinely probative, and the potential for prejudice outweighs whatever probative value that evidence may have. Absent extraordinary circumstances, inquiry into those areas should not be permitted, either during discovery or at trial. Id. at 14 (citing Stats. 1985, ch. 1328, § 1, pp. 4654-4655.)

No such extraordinary showing has or can be made here. On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of such testimony is quite apparent in light of the issues of this case.

Continue reading " Sacramento Employer Tries To Exclude Accuser's Sexual History From Wrongful Termination Suit, Part 5 of 5 " »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this sexual harassment case and its proceedings.)

The holdings of these California and federal courts, in addition to the California Legislature's stated intent, clearly apply to the underlying complaint of sexual harassment by Ms Black in this case. Allowing evidence of Ms. Black's prior sexual conduct, including prior complaints of sexual harassment, with anyone other than the alleged harasser would undermine the clear intent of the California Legislature to prevent the discouragement of complaints and the unnecessary badgering of harassment victims. See Rieger v. Arnold, 104 Cal. App. 4th, at 460. Ms. Black's conduct with individuals other than the Plaintiff, whether in or out of the workplace, is not relevant to the central issue of whether Plaintiff engaged in conduct that violated XYZ's sexual harassment policy justifying his termination.

A case based upon the conduct of a [claimant's] coworkers should not be turned into an investigation of [claimant's] prior sexual history. Knoettigen v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 11, 15 (1990). In short, Ms. Black's private life and/or sexual history with individuals other than Plaintiff does not provide lawful consent to the offensive sexual conduct engaged in and acknowledged by Plaintiff in this case, and which resulted in his termination.

Moreover, inquiry into sexual aspects of Ms. Black's private life not only intrudes upon Ms. Black's right to privacy, but the privacy of third parties as well. See Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 557, 568 (1988). Insofar as [Plaintiff] seek[s] to pry into [Ms. Black's] sexual conduct with others, [he] necessarily seek[s] to pry into the third party's sexual conduct. (citation). Id. When privacy is implicated, the appellate courts have been vigilant to provide extraordinary relief to prevent impairment of these protections. Knoettigen v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d. at 14-15. (citations omitted) While theoretically such third parties could seek to appear in this action and oppose [Plaintiff's efforts] (citation), such privilege under these circumstances is meaningless.... See Mendez v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 568.

Continue reading " Sacramento Man Sues Employer For Wrongful Termination, Part 4 of 5 " »